Evaluative judgments are known to depend heavily on context. For example, the same car that would have been experienced as having brisk acceleration in 1950 would seem sluggish to most drivers today. Similarly, a house of given size is more likely to be viewed as adequate the larger it is relative to other houses in the same local environment.
viewed as adequate the larger it is relative to other houses in the same local environment.
And an effective interview suit is one that compares favorably with those worn by other applicants for the same job.
Although the link between context and evaluation is uncontroversial among behavioral scientists, the reigning economic models of consumer behavior completely ignore it. These models assume that each person's consumption spending is completely independent of the spending of others.
In contrast, James Duesenberry's relative income hypothesis explicitly acknowledges the link between context and evaluation.
1 In this paper we employ a variant of his model to explore the relationship between context and spending patterns.
In this effort, we exploit data that allow us to quantify the effects of substantial increases in income inequality that have occurred in recent decades. According to the life-cycle and permanent income hypotheses, these increases should have no effect on individual spending decisions. In contrast, the relative income hypothesis predicts a substantial change in spending patterns in response to these changes. From statistical analysis of The recent experience of middle-income families also casts doubt on Friedman's portrayal of the relationship between household income and spending. In 1980, the median size of a newly constructed house in the United States was approximately 1,600 square feet. By 2001, however, the corresponding figure had grown to over 2,100 square feet-more than twice the corresponding growth in median family earnings. 4 During the same period, the median household experienced substantial growth in consumer debt.
One in five American households currently has zero or negative net worth.
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Why has consumption expenditure grown so much more rapidly than predicted by traditional economic models? We use the term expenditure cascade to describe a process whereby increased expenditure by some people leads others just below them on the income scale to spend more as well, in turn leading others just below the second group to spend more, and so on. Our expenditure cascade hypothesis is that a pervasive pattern of growing income inequality in the United States has led to the observed decline in savings rates.
II. An Illustrative Model
Consider an economy with N consumers arranged in descending order with respect to their permanent incomes. According to the permanent income hypothesis, individual i's current consumption, C i , is proportional to his permanent income, Y i :
where k is a parameter unrelated to permanent income level or rank. According to this model, each consumer's spending is independent of all income levels other than his own:
Thus, according to the permanent income hypothesis, changes in the distribution of income should have no effect on individual spending levels. If someone's income does not change, his spending will remain the same, even if the income and spending levels of others change substantially.
In contrast to this baseline model, we consider the following variant of the relative income hypothesis: 
where C i and Y i again denote current consumption and permanent income levels of the i th consumer, and where C i+1 denotes the current consumption level of the individual whose permanent income ranks just ahead of i's own. The parameter k is defined as before, and the parameter a (where 0 ≤ a ≤ 1) represents the extent to which each individual's spending is influenced by the spending of those with higher incomes. For a = 0, the spending of others has no influence at all, and the model collapses to the permanent income hypothesis. For a = 1, an individual's spending level is determined entirely by the spending level of the individual whose income just outranks his own. As indicated in equation 4, the highest ranking member of a group consumes according to the relationship assumed in the permanent income hypothesis. In a crude way, this model captures what are perhaps the two most robust findings from the behavioral literature on demonstration effects: 1) the comparisons that matter most are highly localized in time and space; and 2) people generally look to others above them on the income scale rather than to those below.
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A more realistic model would allow explicitly for the possibility that a consumer is also influenced by others more distant on the income scale. But even in our simple model, the influence of such others is captured indirectly through a chain of step-by-step comparisons. For example, if a given consumer were to spend an additional $100, the 6 For a survey of the relevant literature, see Frank, 1985, chapter 2. spending levels of the four individuals ranked just below him would go up by 100a, 100a 2 , 100a 3 , and 100a 4 dollars, respectively.
For illustrative purposes, we consider a hypothetical 11-member reference group with k = 0.8 and a = 0.5. If the highest ranked member in this group consumes 80 percent of his income, lesser-ranked members will consume according to equation (3), which, for the assumed parameter values, simplifies to
For the initial income distribution shown in the left panel of Figure 2 , the corresponding savings rates are shown in the right panel. They range from a high of 20 percent for the highest ranked member (the savings rate that we would see for everyone if the parameter a were equal to zero, as under the permanent income hypothesis), to a low of 12 percent for the lowest-ranked member. The average savings rate for the group is 15.6 percent, or 4.4 percentage points lower than it would have been in the absence of income inequality. We now alter the initial distribution by increasing the incomes of only the two highest-ranked members. In the new distribution, the highest-ranked member earns not 100, but 150; and the second-ranked member earns not 95 but 120. The incomes of the remaining members are the same as in the original distribution. The resulting is an expenditure cascade that lowers the savings rates of all the remaining members. The median earner, with an income of 75 in both distributions, saves at a rate of almost 15 percent under the original distribution, but only 12.3 percent under the new distribution.
Initial incom e distribution
The savings rate for the group as a whole is now only 11.6 percent, a full 4 percentage points lower than it was under the original distribution.
Some economists object that concerns about relative consumption can affect savings rates in the manner described only if consumers are myopic. After all, if a consumer is induced to spend more today because of higher current spending by others, she will have even lower relative consumption in the future. Perhaps so. Yet it may still be rational to be responsive to community consumption standards.
Consider, for example, the fact that in most communities, the median family on the earnings scale now pays much more for housing, in real terms, than its counterpart in 1980. This family would find it easier to live within its means if it simply spent less on housing than others in the same income bracket. But because the quality of public schools in the United States is closely linked to local property taxes, which in turn depend on local real estate prices, this family would then end up having to send its children to below-average schools. 7 In the same vein, a job seeker could live more comfortably for the time being by refusing to match the increased expenditures of others on interview
suits. Yet doing so would entail a reduced likelihood of landing the best job for which he was qualified. It is thus clear that being influenced by community consumption standards need not imply myopia. On the contrary, it may be a perfectly rational response on the part of consumers in pursuit of widely recognized goals.
On the other hand, there is considerable evidence that myopia is a salient feature of human psychology. 8 The pain of enduring lower relative living standards today can be experienced directly. In contrast, the pain of enduring lower relative standards in the future can only be imagined. So even though expenditure cascades can exist in the absence of myopia, they are undoubtedly strengthened by it.
In any event, if individual spending is influenced by the spending of others in the manner assumed in our simple model, an increase in income inequality will give rise to a reduction in savings rates. In the next section we examine how the increase in inequality assumed in our illustration compares with the actual recent growth in inequality.
III. Changing Patterns of Income Growth
In the United States, income growth from 1945 until the end of 1970s was welldescribed by the famous picket fence chart shown in Figure 3 . Incomes grew at about the same rate for all income classes during that period, a little under three percent per year. Figure 4 , the real pre-tax income of people at the bottom income distribution remained essentially unchanged, and gains throughout the middle of the income distribution were extremely small. For example, median family earnings were only 12.6 percent higher at the end of that period than at the beginning. Income gains for families in the top quintile were substantially larger, and were larger still for those in the top five percent. Yet even for these groups, income growth was not as great as during the earlier period. The later period was thus a period of both slower growth and much more uneven growth. For present purposes, an important feature of recent experience is that the aggregate pattern of income changes repeats itself in virtually every income subgroup.
Thus, if we look at the top quintile of the earnings distribution, earnings growth has been relatively small near the bottom of that group and only slightly larger in the middle, but much larger among the top one percent. We see the same pattern again among the top one percent. In this group, the lion's share of income gains have accrued to the top tenth of one percent.
Only fragmentary data exist for people that high up in the income distribution.
But a few snapshots are available. For more than 25 years, for example, Business Week has conducted an annual survey of the earnings of CEOs of the largest U.S. corporations.
In 1980, these executives earned 42 times as much as the average American worker, a ratio that is larger than the corresponding ratios in countries like Japan and Germany even today. But by 2001, the American CEOs were earning 531 times the average worker's salary. There is evidence that the gains have been even more pronounced for those who stand higher than CEOs on the income ladder.
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A similar pattern of inequality growth is observed when we look within occupations and educational groups. It shows up, for example, among college graduates, dentists, real estate agents and high school graduates. 10 The upshot is that almost
irrespective of the identities of the members of a person's personal reference group, income inequality within that group is likely to have grown sharply in recent decades.
Even for the wealthiest reference groups, for which average incomes have risen most sharply, most members are thus likely to have seen their incomes decline relative to those of their most prosperous associates.
IV. Three Specific Hypotheses
In its simplest form, the expenditure cascade hypothesis is that increasing income inequality within any reference group leads to a reduction in the average savings rate for that group. Our attempts to test this hypothesis are grounded on the observation that income growth patterns for most population subgroups in the United States in recent decades are roughly like the one shown for the population as a whole in Figure 5 . Within most groups, people at the top have enjoyed robust earnings growth, while others have seen their incomes grow much more slowly. Our claim is that the new context created by 9 See, for example, Krugman, 2002 . As Wolff, 2002 , has shown, the distribution of household net worth has also be come more right-skewed in recent decades. 10 See Frank and Cook, 1995, chapter 5. higher spending at the top of each group has caused others within the group to save a smaller proportion of their incomes.
An ideal test of this claim would examine how an individual's spending responds when other members of his or her personal reference group alter their spending. But because we cannot identify the specific persons who constitute any individual's personal reference group, we are forced to rely on crude proxies.
We begin by assuming that the amount of income inequality within a person's personal reference group varies directly with the amount of inequality in the geographic area in which that group is embedded. This assumption is more palatable for narrowly defined geographic areas than for broad ones. Thus, for example, the within-referencegroup level of inequality for an individual is likely to correspond more closely to the degree of inequality in the city in which he lives than to the degree of inequality in his home country. In one version of our study, we employ samples of persons segregated by state of residence. In another, we employ samples from the 100 most densely populated counties. Our inequality measures for both sets of jurisdictions come from the 1990 and 2000 installments of the United States Census.
Do people who live in high-inequality jurisdictions in fact save at lower rates than those who live in low-inequality jurisdictions? Unfortunately, the Census does not record information that would enable us to construct reliable estimates of household savings rates by state or county. We are thus forced to examine alternative restatements of the hypothesis that are amenable to testing with available data.
A more general statement of the hypothesis is that families living in highinequality areas will find it harder to live within their means than their counterparts in low-inequality areas. This observation suggests that the expenditure cascade hypothesis can be tested by examining the relationships between various measures of financial distress and measures of income inequality.
Families respond to financial distress in multiple ways, some of which leave clear footprints in data available from the Census or other sources. Beyond saving at lower rates, for example, they tend carry higher levels of consumer debt, which increases their 
V. Empirical Results
In this section, we present the results of empirical studies of the link between inequality and the likelihood of filing for bankruptcy, between inequality and the likelihood of filing for divorce, and between inequality and commute times.
We calculated two measures of income inequality in household incomes. The first was the ratio of the 90 th percentile household income to 50 th percentile household income (P9050). 12 The second is the Gini coefficient, a number between zero and one that indicates the level of inequality across the entire income distribution of an area.
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For present purposes, the Gini coefficient is the preferred inequality measure, because it is Lorenz consistent 14 and accounts for the real income loss experienced by those in the lower reaches of the income distribution between 1990 and 2000, the specific time frame covered by our data. In the results we report below, we thus confine our attention to regressions in which our inequality measure was based on the Gini coefficient. (Results for regressions using the P9050 measures were qualitatively similar.)
To control for unobserved heterogeneity across states and counties, we ran all our regressions in first-difference form. In our bankruptcy regressions, for example, the value of the dependent variable for each area is the difference between that area's bankruptcy filings in 2000 and the corresponding number for 1990. Similarly, the area inequality variable we used was the difference between its Gini coefficient in 2000 and the 12 P9050 ratios for states were calculated using 1-percent microdata samples provided by the Decennial U.S. Census. The ratios for counties were estimated using income brackets. For 1990, these brackets came from 1990 Census Summary File 3, tables P80 and P80A. For 2000, see 2000 Census Summary File 3, tables P52 and P53. 13 We used a program provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census to calculate Gini coefficients. 14 An inequality measure is Lorenz consistent if and only if it is simultaneously consistent with the anonymity principle (permutations among people do not matter for inequality judgments), population principle (cloning the entire population and their incomes does not alter inequality), relative income principle (only relative, and not absolute, income matters), and Dalton principle (regressive transfers from poor to rich increase inequality).
corresponding measure in 1990. 15 Because both years were at approximately the same point in the business cycle, we do not expect this external influence to bias our results.
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Our first-difference regression models thus take the following general form:
where 
A. Bankruptcy
Individuals and married couples may file for non-business bankruptcy under Chapters 7, 11, or 13. To assess whether increases in inequality increase the likelihood of such filings, we use the total number of non-business bankruptcies under any of these three chapters as the basis for constructing our dependent variable.
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In addition to ΔGini, exogenous variables for our bankruptcy regressions include a mix of economic and socio-demographic characteristics measures employed by authors 15 Some Decennial Census data, such as income, are for the year prior to the year of the census. In order to match income data with financial distress, we use non-business bankruptcies for 1989 and 1999. Welfare data used in the divorce rate regressions are from 1990 and 2000.
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Nor do we expect legislation to skew the results, because most bankruptcy law occurs at the federal level. 17 To test for heteroskedasticity, we used a special form of White's test that regresses the squared residuals of the original regression on the predicted values and the squares of the predicted values. We reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity if the F-test on the two independent variables is significant. Instead of reporting the results of this test in every regression, homoskedasticity is assumed unless otherwise stated. 18 All bankruptcy data come from the American Bankruptcy Institute website <http://www.abiworld.org/stats/stats.html>. in the bankruptcy literature, all translated into first-difference form.
19 Economic factors include the change in the twentieth percentile household's nominal income (ΔNomP20), 20 the change in the proportion of total households in which both husband and wife work (ΔTwoWorker), and the change in the unemployment rate (ΔUnemploy). Sociodemographic characteristics include the change in average household size (ΔHHsize), the change in the proportion of total population black (ΔBlack), the change in the proportion of total population Asian and Pacific Islander (ΔAsian), the change in the proportion of total population ages 18-29 (ΔAge1829), and the change in the proportion of total population ages 15 and older divorced (ΔDivorce). In addition, since the number of people filing for bankruptcy in a county is population-sensitive, we include the change in the total county population aged 18 and over as an independent variable (ΔAdultPopulation). Finally, we include the change in population per square mile (ΔDensity). Only the last of these variables, ΔDensity, does not appear in standard bankruptcy studies. We added it to control for the possibility that it might be correlated with social forces that influence the likelihood of filing for bankruptcy.
At the outset, we had no prior views about what functional form would best capture the relationship between income inequality and financial distress. Simple linear regressions of the change in non-business bankruptcies on the change in income inequality revealed a positive, significant relationship in both our state and most populous county samples. But the goodness of fit was generally better in regressions involving the logarithms of the changes in bankruptcy and inequality measures. Also, this specification 19 See, for example, Lawless, 2002; Summers and Carroll, 1987; and Hermann, 1966. 20 Lacking price index data at the county level, we were forced to nominal income. But since the 1990s was a period of relatively low inflation, the change in nominal income for a county ought to be a good approximation for the corresponding change in real income.
was robust across our state and county samples and facilitated easily-interpretable results in terms of elasticities. In Table 1 , we report the results for the ΔlnGini measures for the 100 most populous counties.
The coefficient for ΔlnGini suggests that, as hypothesized, changes in income inequality are positively and significantly associated with changes in the number of nonbusiness bankruptcy filings in our sample of the 100 most populous counties. A one percent increase in the Gini coefficient is associated with an 8.73 percent rise in the number of non-business bankruptcies. This is a remarkably strong effect. This finding is consistent with the traditional view that households with more money should be better able to meet their financial obligations. But the effect is small, and does not rule out the notion that a household's desired consumption may increase hand in hand with income. Although the ΔDensity variable is not statistically significant at conventional levels, this may reflect the existence of threshold effects, since density is extremely high in most of the 100 most populous counties.
B. Divorce Rates
The dependent variable in our divorce regressions is the change in the proportion of the total area population aged 15 and over that is divorced. In these regressions, too, we include the standard economic and socio-demographic factors discussed by other authors in the relevant literature. 21 The main economic factor is the change in the log of the maximum state welfare benefit for a family of three, which captures the impact of the 1996 welfare reform that gave states greater latitude in distributing welfare benefits (ΔlnWelfare). The socio-demographic factors include the change in the proportion of total population aged 25 and over with at least a bachelor's degree (ΔEdu), the change in the proportion of women aged 16 and over in the labor force (ΔWomenLF), the change in the proportion of total households receiving retirement income (ΔRetInc), and the change in the average household size (ΔHHSize). Reform, 2003; and Nakonezny et al., 1995 Note in Table 2 that a one percent rise in the Gini coefficient is associated with a 1.21 percent increase in the proportion of divorced persons in highly populated counties.
Given that the average change in the Gini coefficient between 1990 and 2000 was 4.41 percent for counties in our sample, the estimate implies that increased inequality was associated with a 5.34 percent increase in the number of divorces during this period.
C. Travel Time to Work
In these regressions, our dependent variable is the change in the proportion of all workers aged 16 and over whose daily commute is one hour or more. Here again we include a variety of economic and demographic characteristics that are known to affect our dependent variable. 22 We include changes in the median household income (ΔNomP50) . Because of studies finding a positive relationship between race and commute time, particularly for African-Americans, 23 we control for racial characteristics by including the change in the proportion of total population white (ΔWhite) and the change in the proportion of total population black (ΔBlack). We also include the change in the density of the population (ΔDensity), this time to control for changes in congestion on the roads and in the public transit systems. Finally, we include the change in the proportion of total population receiving retirement income (ΔRetInc), to control for the portion of the population that is probably not commuting.
Again the results for the state and county regressions were broadly similar.
Unlike the earlier regressions, however, we found that ΔGini provided a somewhat tighter fit than ΔlnGini in these regressions and was more robust across our state and county 22 See, for example, Khattak et al., 1999. 23 Ibid.
samples. 
VI. Our Findings in Context
For our three specific measures of financial distress, our findings are consistent with the expenditure cascade hypothesis and at odds with the permanent income hypothesis. Economists seldom change their views about the efficacy of conventional models on the basis of isolated regression findings, nor should they. It is important to recognize, however, that our findings are part of a broader fabric of theoretical and empirical research that conveys a consistent message.
On the theoretical side, our best current understanding of the conditions that molded human nervous systems lends no support to models in which individuals care only about absolute resource holdings. No serious scientist disputes the Darwinian view that animal drives were selected for their capacity to motivate behaviors that contribute to reproductive success. In the Darwinian framework, reproductive success is all about relative resource holdings.
For example, frequent famines were an important challenge in early human societies, but even in the most severe famines, there was always some food. Those with relatively high rank got fed, while others often starved. On the plausible assumption that individuals with the strongest concerns about relative resource holdings were most inclined to expend the effort necessary to achieve high rank, such individuals would have been more likely than others to survive food shortages.
Relative resource holdings were also important in implicit markets for marriage partners. In most early human societies, high-ranking males took multiple wives, leaving many low-ranking males with none. 24 So here, too, theory predicts that natural selection will favor individuals with the strongest concerns about relative resource holdings. The motivational structure expected on the basis of theoretical considerations is thus consistent with the expenditure cascade hypothesis but inconsistent with models in which only absolute consumption matters.
On the empirical side, our findings on the link between inequality and various measures of financial distress complement similar findings by other researchers. Using OECD data across countries and over time, for example, Bowles and Park found that total hours worked were positively associated with higher inequality, both as measured by the 90/50 ratio and the Gini coefficient. 25 Using specially constructed 2000 Census data for a sample of 200 school districts in the United States, Ostvik-White found that median house prices were substantially higher in school districts with higher levels of income inequality, as measured by the 95/50 ratio, even after controlling for median income.
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The expenditure cascade hypothesis is also consistent with detailed patterns in cross-section data that are not predicted by the permanent income or life-cycle hypotheses. For example, as James Duesenberry observed in his 1949 book, a black family with a given absolute income would have had higher relative income in the segregated neighborhoods of the era than a white family with the same absolute income.
And as Duesenberry predicted, the savings rates of black families with a given income level were higher than those of white families with the same income. The permanent 24 Konner, 1982. 25 Bowles and Park, 2002. 26 Ostvik-White, 2003. income hypothesis and the life cycle hypothesis, both of which disavow any role for context in consumption decisions, predict that families will save at the same rate irrespective of where they stand in their respective local distributions of income.
The expenditure cascade hypothesis is also consistent with observed patterns in international savings rates that are not predicted by traditional consumption theories. The aggregate savings rate, for example, was lower in the United States than in Europe in 1980, and the gap has grown larger during the ensuing years. One could invoke cultural differences to explain the initial gap, but the prevailing view is that cultures have grown more similar to each other with globalization, which leaves growth in the savings gap unexplained. The expenditure cascade hypothesis suggests, more parsimoniously, that the observed patterns in the savings data should mirror the corresponding patterns in the inequality data. It thus suggests that Americans saved less than the Europeans in 1980 because inequality was much higher in the United States than it was in Europe. And it suggests that the savings gap has grown wider because income inequality has been growing faster in the United States than in Europe in the years since then.
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Finally, the expenditure cascade hypothesis suggests a plausible answer to the question of why aggregate savings rates have fallen even though income gains have been largely concentrated in the hands of consumers with the highest incomes. As noted earlier, formal versions of the permanent income and life-cycle hypotheses predict no link between aggregate savings rates and differential rates of income growth across income classes. As a practical matter, however, modern specifications of these models have been forced to accommodate the fact that savings rates rise sharply with permanent incomes in cross-section data. If we take that fact as given, the observed pattern of 27 Smeeding, 2001. income growth in recent decades would seem to imply a secular upward trend in aggregate savings rates. After all, the lion's share of all recent income gains have accrued to prosperous families with the highest savings rates. And yet, as noted, aggregate savings rates have fallen sharply.
The expenditure cascade hypothesis suggests that the apparent contradiction may stem from the fact that the patterns of income change within wealthy groups have mimicked those we observe for the population as a whole. As noted earlier, available evidence suggests that no matter how we partition the population, income gains are highly concentrated among top earners within each group. Again, the expenditure cascade hypothesis stresses that local comparisons matter most. So even though more income is now flowing to members of prosperous groups, most members of such groups have been losing ground relative to their most prosperous peers. If it is relative income that drives the bequest motive and if local context is what really matters, the observed decline in aggregate savings rates is not anomalous.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Although persuasive theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that evaluations of consumption goods depend on context, prevailing economic models of consumption disavow any link between spending and context. This disavowal has become increasingly difficult to justify. Prevailing models predict that savings rates will not vary with permanent income; and that savings rates at all levels-individual, local, or national-should be insensitive to changes in the distribution of income. Prevailing models also predict that changes in income inequality should not influence either the number of hours people choose to work or the median price of housing where they live.
Each of these predictions is contradicted by experience.
Economists have generally responded by incorporating ad hoc modifications into traditional theories-as, for example, by positing a bequest motive for wealthy consumers to accommodate the fact that savings rates rise sharply with permanent income in cross-section data. Such moves, however, generally raise more questions than they answer. Why, for example, should only the wealthy wish to leave bequests to their children?
Our claim is that existing fact patterns and theoretical constraints can be accommodated parsimoniously by simple variants of James Duesenberry's relative income hypothesis. We have argued that a simple model incorporating contextdependence predicts a clear link between income inequality and observed savings rates.
Such a model predicts, for example, that the savings rate of any reference group will decline when income inequality within that group rises. This prediction is consistent with observed patterns in U.S. Census data for the 50 states and the 100 most populous counties between 1990 and 2000, a period during which income inequality was rising rapidly. It is also consistent with links found by other authors between inequality and hours worked. It is consistent as well with links found by other authors between inequality and median house prices. Finally, it is consistent with numerous observed patterns in cross-national savings data.
On the strength of available theoretical and empirical evidence, Mr.
Duesenberry's relative income hypothesis clearly merits a closer look.
